Commenting on the French recognition of Peiping, the New York Journal-American of January 28 said: "It is a deliberate and disruptive act.
"It damages NATO unity, which of course did not deter De Gaulle since he has damaged it before in the interests of La Gloire.
"It undermines United States policy and influence in Southeast Asia, where we have been working and fighting, at the cost of American lives, to hold back the aggressive designs of Communism. The De Gaulle action gives powerful support to neutralism, and neutralism in Asia tends to orient itself toward Red China because of the geographical reality of its proximity.
"It enormously increases the prestige of Red China's and thus strengthens Red China, capacity to promote aggression and subversion in other parts of the world. One example, now in the news, is the new guerrilla rampage in the Congo, attributed to Red Chinese agitation.
"It is a supercilious rebuff to Nationalist China, with which France has had diplomatic relations over the years.
"It strengthens the movement to admit Red China to the United Nations.
"Such is part of the price to the Free World of De Gaulle's pursuit of La Gloire—and it is becoming increasingly difficult to determine whether La Gloire applies to the glory of France or the glory of De Gaulle."
'Sheer Mischief'
In an article entitled "Peiping Recognition Seen as 'Sheer Mischief'", Joseph Z. Reday said in the Japan Times of February 9:
"There is not much of business consequence, I suppose, in French President Charles de Gaulle's recent recognition of Red China, but everybody is commenting on it and perhaps I can tie it in with economics. It does not make a great deal of sense, with or without a business angle.
"Gen. De Gaulle is a formidably complicated man and his reasons for this belated move to bring France closer to the Chinese Communists must, therefore, be complicated also.
"I expect that the major one is as his preoccupation with la gloire and his identification of himself as a sort of 20th century Louis XIV.
"In that role he aspires to a new position for France in Asia, and failing anything of positive consequence for France in this part of the world, he seems to be falling back on the nuisance value of exerting his independence from his Western friends and allies by flirting with their enemies.
"This in itself does have a significance, for his nuisance value is great. His recognition of the Chinese Communist government is already shaking the whole strategic pattern of the Far East, and certainly will make Red Chinese to be contained.
"It may well get them into the U.N. and might even contribute to losing some of the shaky countries of Southeast Asia to Communism.
"Whether that is good or bad depends on one's point of view. From De Gaulle's it is evidently good. What is more obscure, however, is to see just what advancement of the French position in the Far East can be gotten from it.
"I have read comment to the effect that France aims to regain a position of influence in the Orient, lost when she was pushed out of Indochina by the same Communists. If so, De Gaulle is extraordinarily foolish to think that he has progressed toward that objective by assuming diplomatic relations with Red China.
"If there is one cardinal axiom in dealing with the Communists, it is the simple one that you exert no influence with them except through strength. Once having offered to recognize Red China, De Gaulle has played all his cards, for France has nothing else to bargain with in the Far East, and the Communists certainly know it.
"In Southeast Asia, France is nothing but an old colonial power which they got rid of by force. I have been doing business in Viet Nam for 10 years, and I have never heard a Vietnamese make the slightest suggestion that a French political voice in that area was either wanted or would be accorded any respect whatever.
"In North Vietnam, it is patently ludicrous to- think that De Gaulle's pretensions would receive any attention whatever except as a means of weakening U.S. resistance to their guerrillas in the south.
"In the matter of trade, France has sold to Red China more than any other Western European country, but aside from the grain windfall, her exports only amounted to about $10 million a year. This is a paltry business, and even if a grateful Communist regime doubled and tripled it, the total would still be all but insignificant.
"Since Red China's purchases from all of Western Europe amount to less than $200 million a year, it is difficult to see how France is going to find any trade bonanza in the fruits of recognition.
"France is not going to discover any new export business in Southeast Asia either. The old Indochina countries are still buying from France as a matter of product and brand habit, but the U.S. long ago displaced France as major supplier and will continue to be dominant as long as aid money constitutes the main source of foreign exchange in those countries.
"Japan will shortly push France out of even second place.
"In the non-Indochina countries France has no commercial place, and is quite unlikely to find one.
"By recognizing Red China, France has forfeited the friendship—and likely much of the trade possibilities—of Taiwan, Korea, probably the Philippines, and quite possibly Malaysia, all far better trade prospects than any she might gain.
"All told, De Gaulle's adventure in the Orient looks like sheer mischief, with no profit to anyone but the Communists.
"In the end France herself is likely to be the major loser, and the whole thing seems to me to prove that De Gaulle knows as little about the Orient as any European and rather less than most."
Utter Contempt
Under the headline "A Blow To The West", the Long Island Star-Journal of January 28 said: "France's diplomatic recognition of Communist China is a distressing renewal of several old problems.
"First of all is the recognition of Red China itself. We do not believe, as we have said before, that Communist China is ready to join the family of nations. Red China has not made any effort to wipe away the blood that has been on its hands since it ruthlessly swept out the Chiang government. Its behavior in Korea, India, Tibet, Laos and South Vietnam amply demonstrates its arrogance. France's recognition will now give opportunity and encouragement for further oppression.
"Secondly, De Gaulle has once again demonstrated his obsession that France is destined once again to play a major role in world history. The grandeur of France apparently means more to him than the unity and strength of the Western alliances. In recognizing Red China, he has acted with utter contempt for these alliances and for the United States as the western leading nation.
"There are arguments that could be made out for France's recognition of Red China at this time. It could be argued that De Gaulle, convinced that we're botching the job in South Vietnam, feels that a solution to the crisis must involve agreement with Red China to neutralize the area. And this could best be done, he thinks, by France, an old hand in Southeast Asia, dealing with Peking.
"It could also be argued that recognition of Peking now could be a way of helping to keep the Moscow-Peiping feud cooking along. De Gaulle feels this is better than our current policy of detente with Khrushchev.
"There is no question, of course, that France wants the new markets for trade offered by Red China. This makes it easier for France to argue that these are no 'good guy' or 'bad guy' connotations to recognition, but that it is simply an acceptance of a de facto situation.
"It is unlikely that recognition will do much to alter the status quo at present; the real test will come later in the year when the U.N. again takes up the question of the admission of Red China. This could conceivably result in a serious blow to the United States' influence and prestige.
"Unfortunately, neither De Gaulle's France, with his inflated notion of its power, nor the western alliance thus stand to be strengthened. The only nation that will benefit from all of this will be Red China."
Great Mistake
The New York Daily News of January 28 said: "After weeks of saying he was going to do it, President Charles de Gaulle of France yesterday recognized the pirate Red China regime of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai.
"It has often been noticed that when a great man makes a mistake it is usually a great mistake that he makes. We think that is what happened yesterday.
"We can't see how De Gaulle, France or the free world will profit from this recognition.
"There is one theory that De Gaulle planned his exchange of ambassadors with Peking as a step toward beefing up Red China in its quarrel with Soviet Russia. This theory was pretty well blasted yesterday by the Kremlin's prompt statement of approval of De Gaulle's act. So it doesn't look as if Big Charles could, if he wanted to, sell any 'Let's you and him fight' ideas to Russia and mainland China.
"Why Gen. De Gaulle did this thing at this time, we don't pretend to know. He is as unpredictable as he is brave and patriotic. We only hope he hasn't started Red China on the road toward enormous power in the world—power which may one day drag the United States into a war to save Soviet Russia, Western Europe, and most definitely France, from being overrun by Chinese Red hordes.
"We've saved France twice from the Germans. Let's hope we don't eventually have to save it from the Chinese.
"And it must be admitted that official U.S. protests against De Gaulle's recognition of Red China sound the least bit fishy when you consider the Kennedy-Johnson Administration's long cozying up to Soviet Russia.
"Maybe De Gaulle's clasping of Mao to his manly bosom will inspire our present leaders to grasp the fact that the real enemy is Communism—Russian as well as Chinese and Yugoslav and Cuban Communism— and to stiffen their backbones accordingly.
"Should that come to pass, we'll gain more than we'll lose from Big Charles's pilgrimage to Peking."
Painful Decision
The Japan Times of February 13 said:
"The action of the Nationalist Chinese government in Taipei in severing diplomatic relations with France, which officially recognized Communist China on January 27, is in line with its declared foreign policy and accords with its contention that there can be no 'two Chinas.'
"Taipei's step was not taken precipitously; in fact, the decision, which must have been a painful one to make, was delayed until notification was received that Paris and Peiping were actually exchanging charges d'affaires.
"It appears that the French government had hoped to be able to maintain relations with both the Mao regime and the Nationalist government, but this was an impossible position in view of the circumstances and especially the fact that both claim to be the sole true government of the whole of China.
"The definite break has now been made and henceforth France and the Chinese Nationalist government in Taipei no longer recognize one another. What will be the consequences? Nothing very immediate is expected but in the long run there are bound to be some changes of import. It may be that France's action will prove the beginning of a process of 'loss from Taipei,' that is to say, other nations may follow suit in recognizing the Red regime in Peiping as the sole legitimate government of China. There will be the larger question of the admission of Communist-ruled China into the United Nations, bound to become a major issue at the meeting of the General Assembly next autumn, and the status of the Nationalist government if it is so admitted. A delicate problem in connection with this situation is the fact that the Nationalist government holds China's permanent seat in the Security Council with the right of veto.
"It would seem that much must depend on what sort of experience France has with Red China in the coming months. It is one thing to exchange diplomatic representatives and quite another to secure harmonious cooperation. This Britain has learned in its contacts with Peiping in no uncertain fashion.
"We have no doubt that the French government will henceforth do its best to cultivate good relations with Peiping, if only from economic motives, but it is certain to find the path a difficult one to tread. The Communist officials in Peiping have so imbued themselves with the idea that the Western powers are China's enemy and that the slightest deviation from Communist totalitarianism is heterodox that the best endeavors from Paris may miscarry.
"So far as economic relations are concerned, the reported idea of Mr. Yaichi Saigo, president of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in France, that French recognition of Peiping might be the initial step to a flourishing triangular trade between France, Japan and Communist China strikes us as being rather farfetched.
"He envisages Japan buying raw materials from mainland China and shipping finished goods to France while France would ship French machinery to Red China. We doubt very much if such an exchange could be organized under foreseeable conditions or even if it were possible whether it would commend itself to any of the three parties. France is certainly credited with a desire to sell machinery to Red China but would certainly expect such Chinese raw materials as are available to be shipped direct to her in return. As for sales of Japan's finished goods to France, hardly more can be expected at present than is provided for in the commercial treaty signed a year ago.
"How far President De Gaulle's policy has succeeded in upsetting the political and economic balance in East Asia can only be a matter of speculation for the time being, but it may well be found in the course of a few months that present expectations have been exaggerated.
"We do not think the Nationalist government in Taiwan will be seriously affected and we do not expect that either France or Communist China will secure very important advantages. As for a 'neutralist' settlement of Indochinese problems, President De Gaulle may find he can make no more headway than others who have attempted to solve an intricate situation."
Wishful Thinking
Commenting on the same topic, the Hongkong Tiger Standard of January 21 said:
"France's impending recognition of Communist China will represent a move of considerable significance, not only for the two countries directly concerned, but for the world as a whole.
"It would, however, seem unwise to exaggerate its importance. In particular, one should not overestimate the effect which the move will have on developments in the Far East.
"There seems no sound reason to suppose, for instance, that it will lead to an end of the war in Vietnam or a settlement of other problems, as has been suggested.
"President De Gaulle is prepared to recognize Peiping because he wants to re-assert France's independence in foreign affairs, and also wants to make her voice heard again in the Far East.
"But France cannot hope to exercise any significant influence on Peiping policy in Vietnam or any other Asian area.
"Peiping will no doubt welcome French recognition as another useful wedge driven between the NATO allies, and also as a means of increasing small nation support for its admission into the United Nations.
"But there seems no chance at all of Mao letting President De Gaulle deflect Peiping from its aims in Southeast Asia, or induce Peiping to effect any substantial modification of its tactics there.
"Recognition is, for both sides, not the outcome of any change in basic policy or objectives, but simply a ploy whereby these objectives may more readily be attained.
"To talk about the move clearing the way for a peaceful settlement of disputes in Southeast Asia seems therefore to be wishful thinking of a high order.
"French recognition of Peiping is not likely to mean more than British recognition of Peiping. And, as the continuing Chinese Communist attacks on Britain over Malaysia make clear, this does not mean very much as far as Far Eastern issues are concerned."
Disconcerting Gesture
Under the headline "De Gaulle's Chinese Folly", Life magazine of January 31 said:
"President Charles de Gaulle of France is a master of the grand and disconcerting gesture. His abrupt decision to recognize Red China will rank as one of the most disconcerting of his career.
"The French present two excuses for being the first major power in 14 years to recognize Peiping. Neither makes much sense unless we take note of the increasingly grandiose scale of Gaullist diplomatic ambitions, animated by a mystical concept of French mission. La Gloire has had much to do with De Gaulle's domestic strength. Now he has apparently decided that it is time to try it out on the world.
"The French hope, first, is that by recognizing Red China they will be able to 'stabilize neutral regimes' in the countries of Southeast Asia which the Communist Chinese are threatening. Secondly, they believe that the permanent isolation of Red China has created a dangerous imbalance in East-West relations. Said Gaullist emissary Edgar Faure recently, 'An innovation on our part would in a way clear up the problem.'
"Thus we are presented with the spectacle of Charles de Gaulle in the character of a heroic lumberjack, wielding his outsize peavey on a historical logjam. And look where the logs go!
"In Southeast Asia, where the U.S. has been spending money and lives for years to hold the line against Red Chinese-backed Communist expansion. De Gaulle's plans for 'stabilization' have a dangerous sound. French influence there is real, but to make it the instrument for settling the conflicts now rending this region is at best sentimental nonsense. While French encouragement of Prince Sihanouk's mushiness in Cambodia is merely annoying, the abortive negotiations which France secretly sponsored last summer between North Vietnam and Ngo Dinh Nhu could subvert our entire containment policy and render it unworkable. In this sense the French recognition is a direct affront to the U.S. and appears to be a reward to the Red Chinese for their militancy.
"The silver lining is hard to find. The State Department takes comfort in the fact that Peiping has not demanded that France break ties with the Nationalist government at Taipei. For the Communists to admit the notion of 'two Chinas' would indeed be a real departure. However, it would commit the Reds to nothing and we have yet to see whether they really mean it.
"Beyond this there is only the faint hope that increased press, trade and diplomatic contact may help crack the hermetic isolation in which (Red) Chinese leaders live and work.
But the French should not be too surprised to find themselves locked up in a legation by their xenophobic hosts, just like all the other frustrated foreign diplomats in Peiping.
"In the face of De Gaulle's unilateral decision, what ought the U.S. to do? If France can indeed offer a realistic alternative to Communist takeover in Southeast Asia, fine. But past Communist Chinese behavior certainly doesn't make the prospect promising, nor does the French record in Indochina. When France withdrew in abject defeat 10 years ago, it was the U.S. that kept the whole area from going Communist. On the contrary, we should seize this opportunity to reaffirm our position: that we are determined to defend any Southeast Asian nation which is willing to fight for its independence."